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Unionists after Unionism
Colin Coulter
Over the last 30 years, the con ict that has overtaken Northern Ireland has often
seemed like it would never cease. People living in the region have routinely
despaired at the prospects of a lasting peace. Academics and other political
commentators have been conspicuous among the despondent. In the last decade,
however, the perennial political gloom that shrouds Northern Ireland has
apparently begun to lift. The political events the region has lately experienced
suggests that Unionists and Nationalists may have begun resolving their substan-
tial differences through means other than violence.
At the heart of this fragile peace process lies a deal struck in the spring of 1998
between representatives of most shades of Northern Irish political opinion. The
Belfast Agreement addresses the complex and troubled relationships that under-
lie the “Northern Ireland problem.” Among the most important is the relation-
ship between people living on either side of the Irish border. The Belfast
Agreement clearly envisages a future of closer ties between Northern Ireland and
the Irish Republic. Under the Agreement, various bodies have been established
to promote cooperation between the Belfast and Dublin parliaments on matters
of mutual concern. The North–South dimension acknowledges the feelings of
“Irishness” that prevail among northern Nationalists. The various cross-border
bodies produced by the Belfast Agreement also represent, however, an attempt
to engage the Unionist community in certain forms of political and cultural
dialogue.
The architects of the political settlement proposed for Northern Ireland seemto assume that a lasting peace demands important changes in the way
Unionists relate to the rest of the island. The Agreement envisages the Unionist
community developing closer ties not only with Nationalists living in Northern
Ireland but also with those living on the other side of the Irish border. It is
anticipated, in other words, that Unionists will in time take their place in a
political and cultural community that encompasses the entire island.
The 1998 political deal makes considerable demands of all the main players
in Northern Ireland but not least of Unionists. If the political future the Belfast
Agreement imagines will take real shape then Unionists must substantially revise
and perhaps completely abandon the way they relate to the Irish Republic. This
represents an extremely dif cult ideological enterprise.
Since the early days of partition, Unionists have acted almost as if the Irish
Republic simply does not exist. The Unionists’ cultural  eld of vision usually
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excludes the remainder of the island; instead, they locate themselves within an
“imagined community” that shares boundaries with the United Kingdom. For
the last century most of the Unionist community has understood itself to be
“British.” Over the period of the present con ict these feelings of identi cation
with the other island have become even keener.
Since the early 1970s a complex set of social processes has drawn many
Unionists more fully into the United Kingdom’s wider cultural and political life.
The current generation of Unionists has rather greater knowledge and experi-
ence of the other regions of the British state than their predecessors did. The
organization of work in Northern Ireland means that many Unionists regularly
interact with colleagues in Cardiff, Edinburgh, London and elsewhere. They
routinely  y to destinations “across the water” for business meetings and
recreational pursuits. The mainstream British media’s penetration of the region
has made Unionists more familiar than ever before with contemporary UK
cultural and political debates.
Their cultural location has caused most Unionists to simply never give the
Irish Republic a great deal of thought. Northern Unionists have remarkably little
knowledge of the matters and  gures that animate public life south of the border.
When Unionists have actually brought themselves to think about southern Irish
society, they have been unremittingly hostile. The Unionist construction of the
Irish Republic has been relentlessly dystopian. In Unionist minds, the course the
26 counties have followed since partition has infringed those ideals of liberalism
and pluralism to which they often proclaim devotion. The architects of southern
Irish society are viewed as assuming there’s only one “people” united in their
commitment to a common ethnoreligious heritage. Unionists claim the Catholic
Church has exerted an authoritarian and baleful in uence over the social life of
the 26 counties. Each incident viewed as an abuse of clerical power provides
Unionists with further damning evidence that the Irish Republic is a sectarian
state.
Unionists have often argued that the moral orthodoxy claimed by theRepublic of Ireland has undermined personal freedom of expression, that
individuals who have resisted conservative Catholicism feel shunted to the
margins of political and cultural life. According to Unionists, the sti ing moral
authoritarianism that shrouds the Irish Republic further discriminates against
social collectivities with cultural traits that differ from the main ethnoreligious
tradition. The Unionist reading of history insists that Protestants living in the 26
counties have fared badly since partition. The decline in the size of the Protestant
community south of the border offers many Unionists compelling evidence of the
cultural intolerance they associate with the Irish Republic.
In the eyes of Unionists, the social order of the Irish Republic has been
fashioned in the image of a people assumed to be not only exclusively Catholic
but entirely Gaelic as well. The course of the 26 counties since partition is viewed
as one of cultural introspection. Irish Republic leaders are held to have rejected
the opportunity to move within the UK’s broader cultural environment and
beyond, and instead to have moved only within the restricted intellectual orbit
of “small town hibernianism.” For Unionists, the Irish Republic’s essential
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parochialism has preserved public life south of the border in the stunted form of
a “Gaelic cultural tyranny.”
Unionism has long assumed that the Irish Republic’s cultural underdevelop-
ment mirrors its economic backwardness. In the decades that followed partition,
a substantial gap opened between the two economies on the island. By the time
the troubles erupted in the late 1960s living standards in Northern Ireland had
moved substantially beyond those of the Irish Republic. Unionists have always
highlighted the economic misfortunes that have periodically overtaken the 26
counties. Unionists regularly dismiss southern Ireland as merely a “potato
republic” whose economic retardation  nds keen expression in the desperate
condition of its public roads.
In the past, the orthodox Unionist conception of the Irish Republic could be
said at least to have had a grain of truth. Were we to cast our minds back to the
late 1980s, for instance, the argument that southern Ireland constituted an
economic casualty would seem rather persuasive. The events since then, how-
ever, have left Unionist readings of the Irish Republic looking distinctly tenden-
tious. Over the last decade, southern Irish society has undergone a remarkable
process of change. A series of sexual abuse scandals has both heralded and
accelerated the seemingly terminal decline of the Catholic Church. Legislation
has been introduced that promises to underwrite a range of indispensable
personal freedoms. The success of artists in an international range of  elds
indicates how fashionable Irishness has recently become. Perhaps the most
remarkable changes, however, have been those in the realm of economics. Since
the mid-1990s, the 26 counties have registered economic growth rates that are
the envy of other Western European states. The apparent economic miracle the
Irish Republic now enjoys has, of course, inspired the ubiquitous and increas-
ingly tiresome metaphor of the “Celtic Tiger.”
The Irish Republic’s recent transformation has fatally undermined many of
the central arguments of Unionist orthodoxy. The view of southern Ireland as a
materially retarded cultural backwater would seem simply perverse to anyone
who has strayed through Cork, Dublin or Galway over the last few years. The
speed and scale of change within the 26 counties have thus far proved
insuf cient, however, to persuade Unionists to re-evaluate the Irish Republic. In
their recent writings, Unionist intellectuals still portray a Republic of Ireland that
bears little resemblance to the reality south of the border. Unionist opinion
forumulators still emphasize clerical abuses in the past as evidence of pervasive
sectarianism in the present. Unionist politicians still portray the Irish Republic as
a “third world” country by making juvenile references to the potholes that
remain in some southern Irish roads.
The marked reluctance of Unionists to acknowledge the Irish Republic’s
advances suggests the scale of dif culties the peace process faces. The political
settlement that is currently being put into place seeks to reconcile the two
principal ideological traditions on the island. Most of those who lent their names
to the Belfast Agreement envisaged a future in which the Unionist community
would adopt a more mature and cooperative stance toward the Irish Republic.
Some may even have regarded the deal as the  rst step toward Unionists
regarding themselves as Irish men and women. So far, however, the Unionist
community has been neither willing nor able to make the leaps of political faith
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the Belfast Agreement demands. In more speci c terms, the Unionists seem
unwilling to amend their vision of the Irish Republic in ways essential to a
political settlement.
Of course, it would be premature to suggest that the Belfast Agreement isdoomed to failure. The changes imagined by those who struck the deal are
fundamental and it will take a long time for any or all of them to come to
fruition. This is no less true of the Agreement’s North–South dimension than it
is of the other constituent elements. Even if Unionists are overtly hostile to the
Irish Republic today, that does not of course mean they will always remain so.
The prospects that Unionists may soon negotiate a more civil and productive
relationship with those with whom they share the island will hinge upon several
considerations.
First, whether Unionists can look south rather than east depends upon the
institutions established under the Belfast Agreement. Several bodies have been
created to consider matters of concern for people on both sides of the Irish
border but they remain limited both in number and in authority. Indeed,
Nationalist representatives have been dismayed that the Agreement’s North–
South dimension has not been given greater substance. But while cross-border
institutions now seem fairly insubstantial, this will not likely remain so for long.
If the fragile peace process survives, the scale of authority available to bodies
with jurisdiction over the island as a whole will grow considerably.
The gradual strengthening of such institutions may alter the disposition of the
Unionist community. In the short term, in uential Unionist  gures will necess-
arily pay greater attention to the Irish Republic than has historically been the
case. Unionist politicians, civil servants and business people will be compelled to
interact with bodies that have one leg in the 26 counties. As the leaders of
Unionist opinion cultivate closer ties with the Irish Republic, the wider Unionist
community will likely follow suit.
If the powers at the disposal of North–South bodies were to expand as
anticipated more Unionists would be drawn inevitably into the island’s wider
public life. Decisions affecting their lives would increasingly be made south of the
border; this would likely nurture Unionist interest in the Irish Republic’s cultural
and political affairs. It would then become routine for Unionists active within
civil society—including trade unionists, professionals, and community represen-
tatives—to travel to Dublin and elsewhere to in uence the course of public
policy. These heightened connections with the Irish Republic might alter
Unionist cultural and political inclinations. As their associations with southern
Irish society grow, Unionists may stop regarding the rest of the island as
irretrievably alien. The Unionist community might even consider a united
Ireland as a place they might be willing to consider home.
The second process relates closely to the  rst. At present the island of Irelandcontains two relatively discrete economies. The trade and investment that
cross the Irish border remain remarkably meager. This will not likely continue
for long. Over the last decade business people on both sides of the border have
realized the possibilities of economic integration. Thus, the two economies will
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likely become increasingly entangled. Given the recent emergence of the Celtic
Tiger, the Irish Republic will likely have greater signi cance for the economic
fortunes of Northern Ireland than vice versa.
The process of economic integration can perhaps transform the Unionists’
cultural  eld of reference. Gradually dissolving the boundaries between the two
Irish economies would draw important swathes of the Unionist community into
networks that encompass the entire island. Unionist business men and women
who used to travel regularly to various locations across the water might begin
venturing as routinely to the likes of Athlone or Roscommon. Civil servants
charged with economic development who have Unionist backgrounds might  nd
themselves making rather fewer calls to Great Britain or the United States, and
more to the Irish Republic. Trade unionists operating in plants established in
Unionist neighborhoods but  nanced with southern Irish capital might  nd it
increasingly necessary to follow the affairs of the Dublin parliament.
The growing tide of trade and investment  owing across the Irish border will
likely transform the Unionist outlook. Dismantling the barriers between the two
Irish economies will likely initiate processes that will enable Unionists to better
understand those with whom they share the island. As these cultural associations
accumulate, the Unionist community might develop a more amicable relation-
ship with the Irish Republic. Were Unionists to cease regarding other Irish men
and women as strangers, then the political possibilities would widen considerably.
While a united Ireland would of course be rather less than inevitable it would
also be rather less unlikely.
The third and  nal consideration focuses on the conduct of perhaps the most
important player in the Northern Ireland problem. If Unionists are to genuinely
rede ne their troubled relationship with Irish Nationalists, much will depend on
the British state. For most of the last century, Westminster and Whitehall have
been profoundly ambivalent toward Northern Ireland. While the British political
establishment has often wished to be rid of the region, it has nevertheless been
unable to imagine the conditions for doing so. London’s ambivalence has been
severely debilitating for the Unionist community. The realization that the British
state wishes to abandon Northern Ireland has inevitably fuelled the paranoia that
corrupts the Unionist political imagination. The reluctance of Westminster to act
upon this political ambition, however, has prompted among Unionists those
puerile forms of intransigence that have left them all but without friends or
in uence.
The future of Unionism and of the entire peace process will, therefore, hinge
largely on the future conduct of the British state. For there to be real political
progress in Northern Ireland in the dif cult years to come the London political
establishment will have to abandon its ambivalence. In simple terms, the British
state will  nally have to come clean. To avoid the dreadful stalemate that has
plagued the recent past, politicians and others in London will have to state
openly and consistently that the British state wants to leave Northern Ireland and
that it will create the conditions to do so. Adopting a more honest stance would
transform the public debate in the six counties. Coming to grips with London’s
abandonment of Northern Ireland will make Unionists understand that though
they have a future, Unionism does not. Political necessity will dictate that
Unionists move beyond past assumptions towards a better political future. The
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Unionist community might even relinquish their unrequited devotion to the
other island so as to imagine more amicable and equitable relations with those
on the island they happen to share.
We cannot, of course, predetermine Northern Ireland’s future. The route theregion will follow in the next few years will depend on the actions
taken—or not taken—by real people. While Northern Ireland’s political destiny
remains undecided, some potential outcomes seem more likely than others. The
political affairs of the last 15 years have nudged the six counties in a particular
direction. The undertow of the current peace process is evidently drawing the
people of Northern Ireland away from Great Britain and toward the Irish
Republic. Having a genuine political settlement in the region will require
substantial changes in Unionist outlook and practice. At some stage Unionists
must revise outdated beliefs so as to develop a more rewarding relationship with
their fellow Irish men and women. As with most things, there is no time quite
like the present.
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